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What makes news more multiperspectival? A field analysis

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Abstract

Democratic normative theory suggests that the news media should promote a broad range of viewpoints, yet little research has attempted to identify and explain variations in press multiperspectivalness. This article introduces new generalizable measures of ideological and institutional pluralism, and applies them to a case study of immigration news coverage by a cross-section of the U.S. and French national newspaper fields. The most multiperspectival newspapers tend to receive less of their funding from advertising and have audiences with higher cultural capital. Consistent cross-national differences may be partially attributed to political field influence and news formats. In contrast to more atomized U.S. narrative-driven news stories, the French ''debate ensemble'' format (grouping together breaking news, editorials, interview transcripts, and background context articles) serves as the opening to a wide-ranging public debate. When U.S. newspapers offered ''multi-genre'' news coverage, their degree of multiperspectivalness also increased.
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1. Introduction

Several strains of democratic normative theory hold that the press ought to foster a wide-ranging debate among diverse kinds of individuals and organizations (Baker, 2002; Ferree et al., 2002). In this vein, Gans (1980, 2003) has long argued that the press needs to be more ''multiperspectival,'' which he sees as an alternative to the unattainable goal of ''objective'' news. Audience research has shown that ''when people are exposed to several competing interpretations [or frames] they are able to think about the political situation in more complex and original ways'' and thus are better equipped to ''perform. . . their civic duties'' (Porto, 2007: 312, 318; see also Chong and Druckman, 2007: 110). Yet despite increasing interest in how the news media ''frame'' issues and how framing processes shape audience cognition (Reese et al., 2001;

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Scheufele, 1999; Snow et al., 2007), there has been little empirical research that systematically measures or explains variation in the degree of press multiperspectivalness; clearly, new theoretical as well as methodological tools are needed.

Building on previous cross-national comparative studies of news media (e.g., Benson and Hallin, 2007; Hallin and Mancini, 1984), this study compares immigration news coverage in France and the United States in order to examine the structural factors promoting or inhibiting a diversity of voices and viewpoints. As Calhoun (1992: 34, 38) has suggested, drawing on the Habermasian imaginary, "...any public sphere is necessarily a socially organized field, with characteristic lines of division, relationships of force, and other constitutive features." The project of analyzing such "characteristic" lines and relationships, however, needs to go beyond Habermas and is crucially aided by Pierre Bourdieu's "field theory." While scholars are increasingly drawing upon Bourdieu to analyze news media (Benson and Neveu, 2005; Crossley, 2004; Rohlinger, 2007), we still lack comprehensive studies that systematically link news discourses with macro-features of fields (relations to political and economic fields, and dominant internal logics or "rules of the game") as well as internal field differentiation (as indicated by measures of cultural and economic capital).

The French media have a closer relation to the "political field" and are less commercialised than the American press (Albert, 2004; Alexander, 1981). In addition, journalistic norms and practices as expressed in the "form of news" (Barnhurst and Nerone, 2001) differ in the United States and France. Because the French and American press differ systematically in these ways— in their relations to political and economic power, and in their professional traditions and practices—we have reason to suspect that the multiperspectivalness of their news coverage will also differ in systematic ways.

One of the main dividing lines between the (neo-)"liberal" Anglo-American media versus the "polarized pluralist" and "democratic corporatist" media of continental western Europe (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 29) is that the former is believed to be more internally pluralist, while the latter supposedly more partisan media systems are more externally pluralist. External pluralism is present when the media system as a whole expresses a wide range of viewpoints; internal pluralism means that each individual media outlet expresses a diversity of viewpoints. France is a "mixed" case, but closest to the "polarized pluralist" model, whereas the United States is the "purest" example of the market-oriented "liberal" model (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). In this study, I am able to test this external–internal pluralism hypothesis because, unlike most media studies (but see Page, 1996; Rohlinger, 2007), I compare media multiperspectivalness across a broad spectrum of national daily newspapers, representing the leading political agenda-setting, financial, and popular newspapers.

Immigration news provides an appropriate case study for a French–American comparison because the magnitude of immigration flows (in terms of foreign-born population) and the relative importance of non-European versus European immigrants in recent years is quite similar in the two nation-states (Fetzer, 2000; Horowitz and Noiriel, 1992). Despite the reputation of the United States as a "land of immigration," its citizens have long been ambivalent about newcomers, no less than the French (Noiriel, 2007; Schain, 2008). In both cases, immigration policy has been hotly contested by a range of social actors—political parties, social movement organizations, businesses, labor unions, academic experts, and individual citizens. Finally, the immigration issue is particularly multifaceted and complex, thus allowing for adequate variation in the dependent variable of news discourse. Previous empirical investigations have shown that French and U.S. immigration debates are dominated by similar themes, only presented with different emphases, cultural inflections, and hierarchical ordering of prominence (Bonnafous, 1991; Chavez, 2001; Gastaut, 2000). For these reasons, a comparison of French and U.S.

immigration coverage is an appropriate case study of the press' capacity to achieve the multiperspectival ideal.

Below, I discuss the major factors that have been identified as shaping the level of multiperspectivalness in the press, and link these factors to key French–American differences. I then explain my methods for measuring multiperspectivalness in news content and present findings about French and U.S. frame and field diversity. Subsequently, I attempt to sort out the complex causal processes shaping multiperspectivalness and conclude with suggestions for future research.

2. Factors shaping multiperspectivalness

Institutional and organizational scholars (e.g., Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) have posited that contemporary societies are composed of a number of competing and semi-autonomous institutional orders or ''fields.'' Journalism is clearly a ''field'' in most if not all western democratic nation-states in that it has developed some limited amount of autonomy from the state and the capitalist market. This structural conception of journalism suggests that multiperspectivalness will be shaped first of all by the journalistic field's positioning vis-à-vis other powerful fields, chiefly the political and economic fields, and second of all, by factors internal to the field itself. I now consider each of these causal claims in turn.

The first argument is that the state powerfully constrains (or enables) the diversity of voices and views in the press, through its power to regulate or subsidize the media, provide official information to the press, and shape the system of parties and elections (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Starr, 2004); this factor concerns the journalistic field's relation to the ''political field'' (Bourdieu, 2005). Although the French state has more restrictive libel laws than does the U.S. government, it also actively promotes press diversity through subsidies targeted to general interest newspapers with low advertising revenues and a national kiosk distribution system that requires that all newspapers, across the ideological spectrum, are made available to the public (Hubé, 2008; Kuhn, 1995). In addition, the two countries differ in respect to the structure of the political party system, with multiple, ideologically based parties playing a more important political role in France than in the United States. Liberal theory suggests that multiperspectivalism will be lower in France because of greater state intervention, and that the French press will tend to ''index'' its news coverage more closely to the government and dominant political parties (Bennett, 1990). On the other hand, state intervention can be seen as compensating for market-led censorship (Baker, 2002) and helping to widen the range of voices and viewpoints in the news.

A second argument is that commercial pressures, and in particular, advertising, narrowly limit the range of debate in the press (Baker, 1994), and that conversely, audience-supported media offer a more wide-ranging discourse (Bagdikian, 1992); this factor concerns the journalistic field's relation to the economic field (Bourdieu, 2005). Multiperspectivalness is supposedly lessened by advertising funding, because the major corporations who spend the most on advertising have an interest in maintaining the status quo and do not want their ads placed next to articles that might offend any potential customers. American newspapers are among the world's most advertising dependent (historically about 80% of revenues) while French newspapers are among the least advertising dependent (40% of revenues on average) (WAN, 2007: 8).

A third claim is that while economic and political factors establish the broad context for press performance, it is journalistic norms and practices historically emerging out of a particular national journalistic field that directly make possible a given level of ideological and social actor pluralism (Bourdieu, 1993, 1998, 2005). Related to this is the claim that the discursive and

graphical organization of journalistic cultural production—the ''cultural form'' (Williams, 2003) of news—plays an important role in facilitating broad democratic debate. Barnhurst and Nerone (2001) usefully point research in this direction, but are limited by their McLuhanist-style formalist analysis (i.e., without reference to actual news content, arguing that less organized, more ''asymmetrical'' forms are inherently more democratic than the more symmetrical, ordered formats of modernist design). It seems quite reasonable to suppose that some contemporary news formats or genres will tend to produce more multiperspectival content than others, but with few exceptions (e.g., Cottle, 1995), this question has scarcely been explored.

In the United States, personalized ''dramatic narrative'' has become a dominant journalistic form (Ettema and Glasser, 1998; Pedelty, 1995: 180–182). In contrast, in France (Albert, 2004; Lemieux, 2004), Germany (Ferree et al., 2002), and Italy (Mancini, 2000), there is an equally strong emphasis on news as reasoned if often polemical debate, specifically oriented toward presenting multiple, diverse viewpoints (a standard that goes beyond the American notion of ''balancing'' two sides). These cross-national distinctions are of course relative, not absolute (Lemieux, 2004). In American journalistic practice, narrative-driven journalism is actualized in front pages filled with unrelated, often lengthy ''stories'' generally written by a single reporter (Weldon, 2007). In contrast, in the French press, the leading news topics of the day are generally presented from multiple angles and journalistic genres—guest commentaries; transcripts of interviews with or lists of paragraph-length ''reactions'' from political leaders, social movement activists, or university researchers; as well as breaking news, background information, and analyses from journalists. This ''debate ensemble'' approach to the news was reinforced as the dominant French approach during the early 1980s when *Libération* created a new ''daily magazine'' format designed as a means of both ''reflecting upon'' and ''conveying the emotion'' of the news (Perrier, 1994: 123–124, 201–202). Still in use by *Libération* today, this ''événement'' (roughly, the ''day's big news'') format is now almost universally emulated by other French national newspapers (Benson, 2004; Guisnel, 2003; Hubé, 2009). Distinct U.S. and French news ''forms'' are likely to have differential effects on the level of multiperspectivalness. Whereas personalized narrative-driven articles tend to ''restrict the room for deliberative exchange of ideas'' (Wessler, 2008: 8), the debate ensemble format is explicitly oriented toward facilitating wide-ranging public deliberation.

Finally, a fourth argument about structural factors shaping the news emphasizes the cultural capital of media outlets and their audiences. Bourdieu (1993: 87–89) argues that ''the structured space of discourses reproduces, in its own terms, the structured space of the newspapers and of the readerships for whom they are produced...'' Thus, in a field analysis, cultural capital of media outlets can be indicated either by factors related to the organization itself (prestige among peers, professional awards, etc., e.g., Duval, 2005) or by factors related to its audience (such as education and occupation). Bourdieu does not make explicit claims about how such social class factors will shape a newspaper's overall degree of multiperspectivalness. However, he generally argues that cultural capital potentially provides some degree of distance from the dominant worldviews. Similarly, Peterson and Kern (1996) suggest that persons with more cultural capital will have more ''omnivorous'' cultural tastes which could conceivably include a taste for diversity in news. Thus, drawing on this model, we might suppose that newspapers whose audiences are highest in cultural capital will also tend to be more multiperspectival than other newspapers.

3. Methodology

This study compares French and U.S. immigration news coverage during ''peak media attention'' years over the past four decades, with an emphasis on the period of heavy and

increasing media attention since the 9/11 attacks. Samples of page one articles and article ensembles (with all related inside articles, including editorials)[1] were drawn for both countries from 2002, 2004, and the first half of 2006, with additional sub-samples from 1973, 1983, and 1991 for France, and 1974–1975, 1986, and 1994 for the United States. During such periods of heavy media attention to immigration, the maximum potential for a lively and wide-ranging public debate on the issue is likely to be reached.

I analyze comparable French and U.S. national newspapers which are produced, respectively, for broad elite or political decision-making audiences, for financial elites, and for popular audiences. The sample newspapers are roughly comparable in their social class composition (Table 1) thus holding constant this important shaping factor on news production in the field as a whole, while also pointing to an additional factor (since no two media outlets reach the precise same mix of social classes) that may help explain differences across media outlets. Income is used to indicate volume of economic capital; higher education is used to indicate volume of cultural capital; occupation "professional" (lawyers, doctors, architects, clergy, teachers, etc.) is used to indicate the proportion of cultural versus economic capital, in which case a higher index score for professionals can serve as a (very) rough indicator for a more oppositional stance vis-à-vis dominant economic power (Bourdieu, 1984: 438).

Thus, the relatively "popular" *Le Parisien/Aujourd'hui en France* is contrasted with the New York *Daily News*, and to a lesser extent the "mid-market" *USA Today*. Some newspapers occupy a high middle-ground, combining high economic capital (income) with somewhat lower cultural capital (education and occupation), as with *Le Figaro*, *La Croix*, and the *Los Angeles Times*, or the inverse (lower economic capital, higher cultural capital), as with *L'Humanité* (in many ways closer to the popular papers, but also reaching more educated government workers, educators, trade unionists, etc.). Finally, national elite political newspapers (*Le Monde*, *Libération*, the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Christian Science Monitor*) and financial newspapers (*Les Echos*, *Wall Street Journal*) combine very high amounts of both economic and cultural capital, in slightly different proportions. The journalistic field as a whole of course also includes other types of media, including national television, newsmagazines, and increasingly online news sites. Thus, the sample in this study is not definitive but only suggestive of how one might go about comparing the functioning of two national journalistic fields, attempting above all to balance national samples by holding constant as much as possible for structural factors such as audience class composition, funding, and circulation. (See Appendix A of the online supplement for additional information on the newspaper sample and sources for Table 1.)

In deciding which articles to count as pertaining to the topic of immigration, I follow previous French and U.S. studies (e.g., Bonnafous, 1991; Chavez, 2001) which included all news coverage focused on broad immigration trends, policy-making and politics, or individual immigrants defined as those who come to a country with the intention of staying to live and work as well as their immediate descendants (at minimum, second or third generation). News articles are analyzed quantitatively, using a number of original content indicators developed for this study and designed to measure general properties of news discourse. Multiperspectivalness is conceptualized as both "institutional" and "ideological." Institutional pluralism is measured by the degree to which individuals or organizations from diverse institutional fields, each with their own semi-autonomous logic, are quoted or paraphrased in news accounts. Social actors are

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[1] Because fewer articles are featured on page 1 in the New York *Daily News* and in both the French and U.S. financial newspapers (*Wall Street Journal*, *Les Echos*; fewer non-business related articles, in these cases), the sample for these media outlets also included articles starting on the first few inside pages.

Table 1
Advertising, readership composition, word length, news genre, and frame and field diversity of French and U.S. national newspapers, 2002–2006.

Newspapers (N article ensembles)	% of revenues from advert.	High income: low income index of parity (ratio)	Higher educ. index of parity	Occup.: profess. index of parity	Mean word length per article ensemble/ (% mixed genre)	Field diversity: mean fields per article ensemble/ (institut. concen. index)	Frame diversity: mean frames per article ensemble/ (frame concen. index)
L'Humanité (63)	11	92:78 (1.2)	120	126	1731 (41%)	4.43 (1010)	3.05 (1930)
La Croix (56)	8	321:98 (3.3)	169	81	2209 (46%)	4.75 (1225)	2.82 (1807)
Libération (60)	20	328:52 (6.3)	219	170	3195 (80%)	6.22 (987)	3.38 (1524)
Le Monde (60)	45	379:49 (7.7)	223	130	2498 (27%)	4.32 (1048)	3.08 (1647)
Le Figaro (48)	70	413:42 (9.8)	176	95	2868 (44%)	4.15 (1243)	3.04 (1441)
Les Echos (45)	70 (est.)	590:51 (11.6)	235	130 (est.)	1237 (13%)	3.00 (1786)	2.67 (1709)
Le Parisien/ Aujourd'hui (47)	28	118:77 (1.5)	85	105	1784 (53%)	4.62 (1393)	2.68 (1790)
FRANCE mean	**36**	**320:64 (5.0)**	**175**	**120**	**2217 (43%)**	**4.50 (1242)**	**2.96 (1693)**
CS Monitor (56)	12	310:14 (22.1)	346	250	1352 (7%)	4.55 (1250)	3.13 (1476)
LA Times (87)	80	206:50 (4.1)	179	150	2091 (8%)	4.46 (1205)	2.79 (1791)
NY Times (68)	65	253:38 (6.7)	250	193	1963 (10%)	4.79 (1301)	2.74 (1693)
Wash Post (81)	61	276:25 (11.0)	213	186	1468 (6%)	4.05 (1469)	2.73 (1914)
WS Journal (62)	69	290:26 (11.2)	261	134	1616 (2%)	3.97 (1291)	2.40 (1837)
USA Today (48)	75	193:41 (4.7)	154	113	1379 (6%)	4.73 (1291)	2.79 (1653)
Daily News (69)	53	149:68 (2.2)	95	95	573 (10%)	2.81 (1564)	1.70 (2847)
U.S. mean	**59**	**240:37 (6.5)**	**214**	**160**	**1492 (7%)**	**4.19 (1339)**	**2.61 (1887)**

Note: The more multiperspectival scores are highlighted. Data sources for Table 1 are available in Appendix A of the online supplement.

categorized according to their affiliation with distinct institutional fields or sub-fields (see online supplement, Appendix B): executive/bureaucratic, judicial, center legislative, center political parties, peripheral political party and legislative, trade unions, religious, university/research, non-profit associations, journalistic, arts and entertainment, business, foreign and international, and polling/public opinion. In addition to these 14 fields, unaffiliated individuals—either immigrants or non-immigrants—were also coded, making a total of 16 institutional categories. While such individuals are not identifiably affiliated with a professional field, they represent a potential expansion of social class based multiperspectivalness. In contrast to Habermas' (1996) public sphere model, with its emphasis on ''center'' and ''periphery,'' my model emphasizes the ways in which multiperspectivalness is fostered through inclusion of a multiplicity of fields, within both center and periphery.

Ideological multiperspectivalness is operationalized as frame diversity. A frame may be defined as the ''central organizing idea. . . for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue'' (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989: 3). All article ensembles were coded for the presence or absence of the range of ''culturally available'' (Beckett, 1996) immigration frames. The frames identified in this article emerged inductively through the analysis of both media and non-media accounts in both countries and also accord closely with previous studies of U.S. and French immigration discourse in the media (e.g., Bonnafous, 1991; Calavita, 1996; Chavez, 2001; Gastaut, 2000).[2]

For this study, frames provide answers to the question: what kind of problem (or positive phenomenon) is being attributed to immigration or immigrants? Immigration-related frames were grouped into 10 frame categories which comprehensively capture the ideological range of debate in both France and the United States. Three broad frames portray immigrants as victims. The ''Global Economic Injustice'' frame emphasizes broad problems of global poverty, under-development, and inequality, of which migration from ''South'' to ''North'' is only one symptom. The ''humanitarian'' frame highlights the economic, social, and political suffering and hardships of immigrants in their everyday lives. The ''racism/xenophobia'' frame highlights individual assaults or systematic discrimination against immigrants on the basis of their ''race'' or their cultural or religious customs. Three additional frames portray immigrants as heroes. The ''Cultural Diversity'' frame emphasizes positive aspects of the differences that immigrants bring to society. The ''Integration'' frame puts a positive spin on immigrants adapting and fitting into their host society, either civically or culturally. The ''Good Workers'' frame emphasizes that immigrants ''perform work that others won't do'' (without acknowledging the low wages that dissuade non-immigrants).

Finally, there are four frames that portray immigrants or immigration as a ''Threat.'' These are: the ''Job Threat'' frame, which accuses immigrants of taking jobs from or lowering the wages of domestic workers; the ''Public Order Threat'' frame, which emphasizes law-breaking of any kind by immigrants, as well as the health or environmental threats posed by unlimited immigration; the ''Fiscal Threat'' frame, which is concerned with the costs to taxpayers of health and educational services offered to immigrants; and finally, the ''National Culture Threat'' frame, which portrays immigrant cultural differences (customs, religion, language) as a threat to national cohesion.

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[2] A frame would be indicated by any empirical (or normative) reference to relevant aspects, whether made by a journalist or named or unnamed sources. Articles were coded by three independent coders. Using a random sub-sample of 5% of the total sample, inter-coder reliability (using Holsti's method) was calculated for frames and institutional fields at the article level. Inter-coder reliability for frames ranged from 0.751 to 1.000 and averaged 0.888, and for institutional fields ranged from 0.837 to 0.995 and averaged 0.919.

The six ''Victim'' and ''Hero'' frames correlate roughly with ''pro-immigration'' advocacy, while the four ''Threat'' frames correlate with ''anti-immigration'' advocacy. However, it is also important to note the ways in which typical categories of ''left'' and ''right'' are scrambled in immigration politics (Zolberg, 2006). On the so-called pro-immigration side are both neo-Marxists (global injustice) and laissez-faire capitalists (good workers); on the so-called anti-immigration side are both labor union protectionists (jobs) and balanced budget conservatives (fiscal). For better or worse, multiperspectival news does not take sides in this complex debate, but rather simply seeks to present the widest possible range of the available frames for public consideration.

In what follows, both frame and institutional multiperspectivalness are measured at the day-to-day article (or article ensemble) level and at the level of overall coverage (over the entire sample period) for each media outlet.

4. Findings

Article level analysis counters the assumption that French newspapers will not be as internally pluralist as their American counterparts. As shown in Table 1, during the 2000s, French newspapers averaged 4.5 unique institutional fields per article, versus 4.2 fields per article in the U.S., respectively ($p = .009$).[3] French newspapers also feature significantly higher frame diversity than American newspapers, on average about 3.0 frames compared to 2.6 frames per article or article ensemble ($p < .000$).

To supplement these article level measures of multiperspectivalness and to control for daily coverage word length, I also analyzed the totality of the coverage. Appendix B of the online materials presents a selection of the sixteen institutional fields, with combined totals for unaffiliated individuals and polls (citizens, immigrants, pollsters, and categories of poll respondents) and for ''civil society''-related fields including trade unions, religious, university/research, non-profit associations, journalistic, and arts and entertainment. It is clear from this data that the French press is not dominated to a greater extent than the U.S. press by political elite voices. Supporting previous research comparing continental European and U.S. media (Benson and Hallin, 2007; Hallin and Mancini, 1984), the U.S. press is simultaneously more elitist and more populist. Governmental and dominant political institutions (including judicial and center parties) make up on average 41.4% of speakers cited in U.S. newspapers versus 34.0% in French newspapers. Likewise, unaffiliated individuals and polls make up 23.1% of speakers cited in U.S. newspapers versus 16.3% in the French press. French newspapers, on the other hand, give greater voice to civil society viewpoints (30.7% of all citations, vs. 25.6% in the U.S. press); to the extent that many peripheral parties (such as the environmentalist Greens and the anti-immigration National Front) serve political functions taken up by social movement organizations in the United States, any true accounting of equivalent civil society sectors should include peripheral parties as well, in which case the French–U.S. gap increases to 36% versus 25.7%. One exception to this pattern is the *Christian Science Monitor*, which accords the highest proportion of citations to civil society speakers (39.5%) of any newspaper, French or American, in the sample.

Media discourse in France and the United States also encompassed a broad range of immigration frames (see online supplement, Appendix C); although some newspapers ignored

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[3] Means refer to presence or absence of a given field or frame category in an article ensemble. Whereas frames were only coded as binary variables, fields were also coded for all distinct speaker mentions (for analysis of totality of coverage). In order that newspapers with larger sample sizes do not dominate the analyses, averages equally weight all of the media outlets.

certain frames, no frame was entirely excluded from either national newspaper-mediated public debate. Nevertheless, some frames clearly appeared more frequently than others. In France, the humanitarian frame appeared most frequently (28.0% of all frame mentions), followed by the public order frame (17.8%), the racism frame (14.3%), and the national culture threat frame (12.1%). In the United States, the humanitarian frame likewise appeared most often (29.2%), followed closely by the public order frame (24.9%), with the only other frame achieving a double-digit percentage being the good worker frame (11.5%).

Drawing on this data on total news coverage, how then do we assess the internal and external pluralism of French and U.S. national newspapers? One way of measuring field and frame diversity across total news coverage is provided by the Herfindahl index, which has been used fruitfully by cultural sociologists to measure homogeneity (e.g., Dowd et al., 2002; Entman, 2006). I use the Herfindahl index to measure the extent to which news coverage is concentrated or dispersed relatively evenly across the sixteen institutional field categories (''institutional concentration index'' or ICI) and 10 immigration-related ideological frames (''frame concentration index'' or FCI). The index is calculated simply by squaring the percentage that each institutional field or frame appears in a given newspaper (relative to all fields or frames appearing in its news coverage) and then summing the total. The highest possible score is 10,000 (indicating total dominance by a single frame or field, i.e., 100×100); how low it goes depends on the number of categories in the model, but the lower the score the more even the dispersion of coverage across the range of possible institutional fields or frames. For example, the FCI score for the *Daily News* (the most ideologically concentrated of all the newspapers in this study) is calculated by squaring each frame's percentage of all frames (e.g., a squared 9.4% for the racism/xenophobia frame equals 88.4) and then summing the squared percentages, for a total of 2847 (see Table 1 and Online Supplement, Appendix C).

During the 2002–2006 period, French newspaper coverage of immigration is less ideologically and institutionally concentrated than U.S. coverage (Table 1). Against a standard of 1000, representing a perfectly evenly balanced presentation of all possible immigration frames (10 frames of 10% each), French newspapers average a frame concentration index score of 1693 compared to the U.S. average FCI score of 1887, which is more than 11% higher. French newspapers also offer institutionally less concentrated news coverage. Against a standard of 625 representing perfectly evenly balanced presentation of all possible institutional field viewpoints (16 fields of 6.25% each), French newspapers on average score 1242 versus a U.S. average of 1339, an 8% difference.

Over-time research of immigration news coverage by the leading ''agenda-setting'' (McCombs, 2004) national newspapers (the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Los Angeles Times* vs. *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro*, and, from the 1980s onward, *Libération*) confirms that greater French multiperspectivalness is consistent over time, although the French–U.S. gap has narrowed slightly (Table 2). At the article level, French field diversity was higher to a statistically significant extent during the 1970s, 1980s, and 2000s; likewise, French mean ICI scores were lower (more multiperspectival) than U.S. mean scores during all four periods. French frame diversity was also higher at the article level during all four time periods; however, French mean FCI scores were more multiperspectival only during the 2002–2006 period. There is some evidence of cross-national convergence over the four decades. Between the 1970s and 2000s, field diversity rose in the leading French newspapers from 4.50 to 4.90, while U.S. field diversity increased from 2.83 to 4.43, with the gap falling from 1.67 to 0.47. Likewise, French newspaper frame diversity fell slightly from 3.75 to 3.17 frames per article ensemble, while U.S. frame diversity rose from 2.50 to 2.75 frames per article ensemble, thus narrowing the cross-national gap from 1.25 to 0.42.

Table 2
Institutional field and frame diversity (mean per article/mean concentration index), by time period[a] and news event generation[b].

	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	Political field generated	Journalistic field generated	Civil society fields generated
France							
Mean fields per article ensemble/mean ICI score (N)	4.50/1228 (37)	4.79/1409 (72)	4.31/1587 (132)	4.90/1093 (168)	4.30 (328)	3.94 (127)	5.23 (167)
U.S.							
Mean fields per article ensemble/mean ICI score (N)	2.83/2379 (63)	3.61/1725 (81)	4.06/2184 (106)	4.43/1325 (236)	3.69 (396)	4.26 (245)	4.71 (83)
FR–U.S. differences	**1.67[c] 1151[e]**	**1.18[c] 316**	**0.25 597**	**0.47[d] 232**	**0.61[c]**	**−0.32**	**0.52**
France							
Mean frames per article ensemble/mean FCI score (N)	3.75/1673 (37)	3.43/1801 (72)	3.45/1744 (132)	3.17/1537 (168)	3.17 (328)	3.21 (127)	3.05 (167)
U.S.							
Mean frames per article ensemble/mean FCI score (N)	2.50/1607 (63)	2.85/1447 (81)	2.80/1675 (106)	2.75/1799 (236)	2.37 (396)	2.87 (245)	3.43 (83)
FR–U.S. differences	**1.25[c] −66**	**0.58 −354**	**0.65[d] −69**	**0.42[d] 262**	**0.80[c]**	**0.34[d]**	**−0.38**

Notes: The more multiperspectival scores are highlighted; Ns are for article ensembles.
[a] Means of *New York Times, Washington Post,* and *Los Angeles Times* for U.S.; means of *Le Monde, Le Figaro,* and *Libération* (1980s–2000s) for France.
[b] Overtime select sample (1970s–1990s) plus total sample (2000s).
[c] French–U.S. difference, $p \leq .005$.
[d] French–U.S. difference, $p \leq .05$.
[e] Because lower FCI/ICI scores are more multiperspectival, negative French–U.S. differences are represented as a positive amount.

Table 3
External pluralism: mean high–low raw percentage gaps in field diversity and frame diversity.

	1970s (Big 3)	1980s (Big 3)	1990s (Big 3)	2000s (Big 3)	2000s (All)
Field diversity					
France	2.0	5.6	4.1	3.1	8.7
U.S.	4.1	4.1	5.1	2.8	6.4
Differences	−2.1	1.5	−1.0	0.3	2.3
Frame diversity					
France	3.2	6.9	3.7	3.0	8.2
U.S.	4.6	5.1	4.6	3.2	7.8
Differences	−1.4	1.8	−0.9	−0.2	0.4

Note: The 1970s French data only include *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*. Thus, to facilitate a cross-national comparison, the U.S. 1970s figures are averages of the binary differences between *Los Angeles Times* and *New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times* and *Washington Post*, and *New York Times* and *Washington Post*.

External pluralism may be indicated by the average ''gap'' between the extremes in the prominence accorded to all fields or frames by all newspapers. For example, the French gap for the global injustice frame (see Appendix C of online materials) is 10.5 percentage points (*Libération*'s 11.3 minus *Aujourd'hui en France*'s 0.8). External pluralism for frame diversity would thus be calculated by averaging these percentage gaps or spreads for all 10 frames, and the same types of calculations would be used to determine institutional pluralism across the 16 field categories. For the 2002–2006 period, the average high–low gap for fields was 8.7 percentage points for the French press versus 6.4 percentage points for the U.S. press (see Table 3). Frame external pluralism was 8.2 percentage points for the French press and 7.8 percentage points for the U.S. press. Again, examining just the agenda-setting newspapers in each country, there has been some decline since the 1980s in the absolute level of external pluralism in both countries, and a narrowing of the French–U.S. cross-national gap in both field external pluralism (from 1.5 to 0.3 percentage points in field diversity, and from 1.8 to −0.2 percentage points in frame diversity). Nevertheless, it does not seem to be a case of declining French external pluralism replaced with rising internal pluralism, moving France closer to the supposed American ''model.'' Rather, by a number of measures, the French press has been significantly more internally pluralist than the U.S. since the 1970s, and the evidence is mixed on the degree of cross-national convergence over the past three plus decades (e.g., a decline in frame diversity in France and a slight rise in the U.S. measured at the article level, and a fairly consistent increase in field diversity in both countries regardless of the measure).

5. Explaining variation in multiperspectival news

Does the level of commercialism, indicated by reliance on advertising, help explain multiperspectivalness? Several of the most multiperspectival newspapers in this study receive only minimal advertising funding, chiefly *Libération* (highest overall field diversity of 6.22 fields per article ensemble and best overall ICI score of 987, as well as highest overall frame diversity of 3.38 frames per article), the *Christian Science Monitor* (highest U.S. frame diversity of 3.13 frames per article ensemble and best FCI score of 1476), and *L'Humanité* (second most multiperspectival French ICI score of 1010, and high frame diversity of 3.05 frames per article ensemble). However, other newspapers exhibiting high multiperspectivalness, such as *Le Figaro* (best French FCI score of 1441), the *Los Angeles Times* (best U.S. ICI score of 1205), and the *New*

York Times (highest U.S. field diversity score of 4.79 fields per article ensemble), rely heavily on advertising funding. Thus, the influence of advertising is not absolute and is evidently mitigated by other factors.

To what extent do individual newspapers, both within and across national boundaries, express content similarities that can be correlated with audience social class composition? The most multiperspectival newspapers—*Libération* and the *Christian Science Monitor*—have audiences that are disproportionately highly educated and likely to be professionals with a relatively high proportion of cultural capital. The *Daily News*, a newspaper with a popular readership, was the least multiperspectival in the sample; however, the equally popular *Parisien/Aujourd'hui* was relatively multiperspectival compared to *La Croix* and *L'Humanité*, as well as the *Washington Post* and *Wall Street Journal*.

Whereas economic field influences and audience composition vary in their effects on newspapers, all newspapers within a given national field are arguably affected to a similar degree by both political field influences (state regulations, reporter relations with their information sources, etc.) and by the internal logic of the journalistic field as expressed in the dominant formats of organizing and presenting the news. How can the relative impact of these influences be sorted out? One answer is provided by the second part of Table 2, which categorizes the total sample (1970s–2000s) according to how the news coverage was generated (Molotch and Lester, 1974), whether by the *political field* (legislative debates, executive announcements, electoral campaigns, etc.), the collection of *civil society fields* (demonstrations, strikes, or other media "events" staged by associations, unions, etc.), or the *journalistic field* (investigations or in-depth coverage of issues involving independent journalistic initiative, as well as media-sponsored polls). This analysis demonstrates that the largest French–U.S. difference in field and frame diversity is for political field generated news, suggesting that cross-national differences in political fields are a strong influence. Political field news generation has no statistical effect on French field or frame diversity but in the United States actually reduces fields per article ensemble by 0.198 and frames per article ensemble by 0.227 (2002–2006 data not shown in tables; effects across entire four decades were very similar). One could interpret this as showing the negative effects on press multiperspectivalness of the U.S.' narrow two-party political system, as well as the particular non-ideological way (focusing on political strategy or criticizing government performance) that U.S. mainstream journalists tend to cover politics and government. In contrast, in both France and the U.S., civil society generated news increases multiperspectivalness (2002–2006 data not shown in tables; effects across entire four decades were very similar): 0.181 fields per article ensemble and 0.183 frames per article ensemble for the U.S., and 0.187 fields per article ensemble in France (with no statistically significant effect on frame diversity). In this regard as well, differences in political systems are crucial. While civil society generated news is relatively more multiperspectival in both countries, the French political system and political cultural tradition do more to encourage civil society activity (especially strikes and protests) than do the U.S. system and tradition (Veugelers and Lamont, 1991), and thus part of the difference in French and U.S. press multiperspectivalness is because a significantly higher proportion of immigration news coverage is civil society generated in France than in the United States (about 26% of the total sample vs. 11%, respectively; data not shown in tables).

Finally, there is also clear evidence that a multi-article, multi-genre "debate ensemble" format of news contributes to higher multiperspectivalness. As the newspaper that pioneered the "événement" debate ensemble formula, *Libération* is also the most consistently multi-perspectival of all the newspapers in the sample. Widespread French adoption of the multi-article, multi-genre format of news (combining news, analyses, interviews, historical background

Table 4
Correlations between news genre and article ensemble level field and frame diversity, 2002–2006 (Holding constant for word length).

	France field diversity	U.S. field diversity		France frame diversity	U.S. frame diversity
Multi-genre (news and any other)	0.601[**] (0.358[**])	0.255[**] (0.124[**])		0.361[**] (0.148[**])	0.211[**] (0.107[*])
News only (event and/or feature/background)	−0.462[**] (−0.201[**])	−0.203[**] (−0.107[*])		−0.354[**] (−0.163[**])	−0.188[**] (−0.112[*])
Other only (commentary, analysis and/or interview transcript)	−0.247[**] (−0.187[**])	0.008 (0.033)		−0.009 (0.036)	0.033 (0.053)

[*] $p \leq .05$.
[**] $p \leq .005$.

stories, and commentaries) also helps explain how even admittedly partisan newspapers such as the communist *L'Humanité* as well as the popular audience-oriented *Parisien/Aujourd'hui en France* are able to maintain a higher than average level of multiperspectivalness. Not all French newspapers were more multiperspectival than their U.S. counterparts in every way, and some U.S. newspapers, in particular, the *Christian Science Monitor*, exhibited a high degree of frame and institutional diversity even though they did not frequently use the debate ensemble format.

Nevertheless, as Table 4 shows, there are strong and statistically positive multiperspectival effects in both France and the United States from multi-genre news (coverage that mixes (1) event news or feature/background articles with (2) any of the following: journalist-authored analyses or commentaries, non-journalist-authored commentaries, or interview transcripts). Even when controlling for word length, multi-genre coverage increases French field and frame diversity article ensemble means by 0.358 and 0.148, respectively, and U.S. field and frame diversity means by 0.124 and 0.107, respectively (2002–2006 period; effects across entire four decades were very similar). The higher French scores may be interpreted as reflecting, at least in part, the more closely coordinated interplay of genres in news coverage with the express purpose of increasing multiperspectivalness. Conversely, use of only news genres (event news and feature/background articles) has a negative effect on multiperspectivalness in both France and the United States. In France, coverage limited to analysis, commentary, or interview transcripts also has a negative effect on field diversity, probably due to the tendency of these genres to limit citations of social actors other than the author or person being interviewed; effects on U.S. news coverage are difficult to determine because of the small number of "other only" articles in the U.S. sample.

6. Conclusion

This article has sought to achieve three purposes. First, I have introduced new generalizable measures of ideological and institutional pluralism in the press. Frame analysis has tended in the past to focus on documenting the substantive focus of media coverage on a case-by-case basis; this study is among the first to present ways of measuring generalizable properties of issue frames such as frame diversity (distinct frames per article) and a frame concentration index. In addition, I challenge Habermas' (1996) emphasis on center and periphery in the public sphere, and instead analyze the multiplicity of institutional fields that appear in the news. Similar to my frame analysis, I measure field diversity at the article level and develop a (field) institutional concentration index.

There are nevertheless limitations to these indicators, each of which measures distinct aspects of multiperspectivalness. For instance, during the 2002–2006 period, *L'Humanité* presented a relatively high 3.05 frames per article ensemble; however, for the same period, it also had a relatively high FCI score of 1930, reflecting the fact that just two frames made up more than half of all those mentioned in its total coverage (see online materials: Appendix C). Although front page French news is more multiperspectival than U.S. news, this pattern may or may not hold for coverage that begins on the inside pages. However, it seems appropriate, as in this study, to highlight those articles that are given the greatest prominence by newspapers and are thus likely to reach the largest audience. The measures used in this study place equal values on all voices (fields) or viewpoints (frames). However, in line with democratic normative theories that emphasize particular voices, such as experts or certain civil society actors, future research could focus more on their unique contributions to public debate. In addition, measuring the valence (positive, negative, or neutral) attached to a frame could help distinguish media outlets (e.g., *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*) whose similarities in field or frame diversity as measured in this study may in fact mask significant ideological differences. (In another study drawing upon the same press samples (Benson, 2010), I am able to identify valence differences among media outlets, especially in France, according to the types and targets of critical statements appearing in news coverage.) Going beyond this case study, future research could examine other issues, time periods, and types of media.

A second purpose has been to document empirical similarities and differences in news content of French and U.S. national newspapers, testing widespread assumptions that French (and other continental European) press systems are more externally pluralist but less internally pluralist than the U.S. system. I find that French newspapers, taken one-by-one, are on average more internally pluralist than their U.S. counterparts, and this difference holds up over the past four decades. The French national newspaper field as a whole is also slightly more externally pluralist than the U.S. national newspaper field during the 2002–2006 period. On the other hand, over-time data on the leading agenda-setting newspapers in each country finds external pluralism often higher in the U.S. than in France, with the cross-national difference diminishing over-time. The complicated historical patterns of French and U.S. similarities and differences in field and frame diversity do not fit neatly into an ''Americanization'' hypothesis and require further analysis beyond the scope of this article.

Finally, a third purpose has been to use this broad French–American comparison, and the analysis of individual French and U.S. newspapers, to assess competing claims in the sociology of news about factors shaping the level of frame and field diversity. This study shows that the most multiperspectival newspapers in both countries tend to receive less advertising support and are read disproportionately by audiences with high cultural capital. Political fields are shown to exert both positive and negative effects on press multiperspectivalness. Positively, French governmental press subsidies make it possible for newspapers with substantially lower advertising revenues than in the U.S. to survive, thus increasing both internal and external pluralism in the French journalistic field. Negatively, the two-party U.S. political system (and the consequent ways in which the mainstream press has come to cover it) seems to have a dampening effect on multiperspectivalness. Finally, this study has also shown how the logic of the field, as mediated by news ''form,'' reinforces and contributes to more multiperspectival news. Multi-genre news formats probably have stronger multiperspectival effects at the level of the day-to-day coverage (as frames or fields per article ensemble) than at the level of long-term coverage: indeed, this simultaneous juxtaposition of multiple voices and viewpoints is at the heart of the French–U.S. difference in print newspaper format. Arguably, such ''immediate'' as opposed to ''over-time'' multiperspectivalnesss does more to foster civic reflection and engagement.

However, newspapers such as the *Christian Science Monitor* and the *New York Times* are also quite multiperspectival in some respects even at the level of daily coverage and yet only occasionally use the multi-genre format. Additional research on the multiperspectivalness of other formats is thus needed (see, e.g., McKay, 1989; Christian Science Monitor, 2008). More research is also needed to assess how the ''form'' of news is changing online and how these new ways of constructing and connecting multiple journalistic genres are contributing to multiperspectivalness (as with, for instance, the *New York Times*' ''Extra'' edition).

While multiperspectival news can serve democracy, its limits should be acknowledged. Multiperspectival news can help broaden readers' understanding of an issue and encourage them to engage in debate, but it does not necessarily sort out good claims from bad. Future research should thus examine the links between multiperspectival news and rational/critical qualities of discourse, that is, not only who speaks and what aspects of an issue they raise but how they speak, including comprehensiveness and depth of argumentation or critical tone (Ferree et al., 2002; Wessler, 2008). It also remains an open question which kind of news is most likely to influence public policy-making. Conceivably, the personalized, narrative approach of U.S. news may do more to attract broad citizen attention and lead to policy reform than France's more abstract, ideas-based journalism. It is also not self-evident that the French government's policies on immigration are any more enlightened than those currently in place in the United States. These and other connections between practices and forms of reporting and policy outcomes certainly deserve more attention.

Acknowledgements

Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.poetic.2009.09.002.

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